Abstract
Introduction
It is quite a common notion both inside and outside the country that most of Russian manufacturing is based on the obsolete technologies, incompetitive, at least on the global markets, and has no future. We would argue that while there are acute problems with the development of this sescor there have been a lot of positive changes in recent years, in particular on the micro-level. And this gives some hope for revival of manufacturing.
Manufacturing industry started to revive from transitional shock after 1998 crisis using the advantages of devaluated national currency, relatively cheap labor and free production capacities. For several years this development was mostly extensive -based on growing internal demand and import substitution with little new investments and innovation. By the mid 2000s the most important sources for extensive development originating from the crisis of 1998 were largely depleted. It seemed imminent that Russian manufacturing firms would have to look for a different -intensive -development strategy, involving new market entry, technological upgrade and product innovation (World Bank 2007) . It should be admitted today that those expectations did not come quite true. In fact, in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , an exceptionally favorable external environment and terms of trade, rapid expansion of domestic demand and improved access to borrowings helped most industrial enterprises to maintain their market power and, moreover, to increase output without any significant changes in their technologies, innovation risks or entering new, first of all, international markets. There were no revolutionary breakthrough, but on the macrolevel the share of manufacturing sectors in the national GDP stayed stable and there was relatively fast growth of labor productivity, mostly due to decrease of employment without the corresponding drop of production.
This would not mean, however, that there were no progress at all. The overall smooth evolution was masking over a robust restructuring under way in individual firms that were changing their behaviors for more market-oriented, despite the underlying institutional arrangements that remained far from "ideal". For better understanding the major trends inside the manufacturing one need to look not so much at macroeconomic data but at indicators of performance and behavior on micro-level. This paper is not attempting to cover all the aspects of manufacturing firms behavior but concentrates mostly on answering several important questions. Were the pre-crisis years a time of efficient growth? Which firms enhanced competitiveness? What were the major changes in the behavior of firms in terms of innovation, management, state-business relations, etc.? These questions seem no less important both for an assessment of the current situation and for designing economic and industrial policies to recover from the crisis. It should be noted that the data we use in our research is dated spring 2009 when the crisis has already hit the Russian economy badly. But it was before the consequences of the crises were fully realized. Thus, our findings mostly focus on the changes in pre-crisis period.
The empirical base for this study is the data of two rounds of the survey conducted in 2005 and 2009 . 1000 of medium and large firms in 8 sectors of manufacturing have been surveyed in each round and about 500 of firms has been surveyed twice providing a panel sample for comparisons of two years 1 .
Manufacturing industries in 20052008: macroeconomic and institutional environment
Right up to mid 2008, the manufacturing industries were developing in an exceedingly favorable economic environment. Domestic demand was expanding dramatically, external financing was getting more and more available as real interest rates on bank loans were decreasing to become even negative at times, foreign investment in Russia's manufacturing was also building up. On the negative side during that period, manufacturing was adversely affected by persistently high inflation (albeit moderate compared to the previous period), REER appreciation and accelerated growth of labor costs.
In this context, manufacturing successes look, on the one hand, unquestionable, but on the However, with due regard to the high inflation, this profit margin can hardly be called impressive.
An important obstacle to higher manufacturing competitiveness during the boom period was a lack of meaningful progress in the institutional environment. During 2005-2009, respondents' assessments of business barriers remained largely unchanged. Fig.1 (Fig. 2) . Thus, to a certain degree, the competition from "Russian foreigners" was probably replacing direct competition from imports. 
Quality of growth
Our analysis shows that in general the growth in manufacturing was driven by more productive and more competitive firms. This fact can be illustrated by comparing the dynamic of three groups of enterprises. Using the performance data for our firms in 2004 we have constructed a simple indicator based on firms' individual labor productivity compared with average labor productivity of the industry (type of economic activity) the firm belongs to and on the base of top-managers assessments of the competitive position of their firm relative to firm's main competitors. If a firm claims that it is a competitive leader, while its labor productivity is above the average sector level, we would classify it to the group of leaders. If a firm assesses its competitiveness lower than that of the leaders, while the gap is not closing or is widening, and labor productivity is below the average for this type of economic activity, it would be classified to the group of outsiders. All the rest of firms would fall within the "midrange" group in terms of competitiveness. As we realize the arbitrary and limited character of this grouping, we still think it is quite instrumental for drawing a clear line between leaders and outsiders. According to the selected criteria, the group of leaders would then include about a quarter of surveyed enterprises, the "midrange" group would get about 55 percent, while the group of outsiders -about 20 percent of the sample. Another group -with midrange competitiveness -was growing at a rate of 17 percent, while the 2005 outsider group was averaging below 10 percent a year. Therefore, the key contributors to output growth before the crisis were more competitive businesses with higher profitability.
Output increases in the group of the most competitive firms were accompanied by labor productivity advances at similar rates. In other words, these enterprises were increasing output basically without any increases in employment, albeit without any significant shedding of jobs. The midrange group was improving productivity at higher rates, however, by means of labor downsizing. The highest rates of productivity growth were observed in the low competitiveness group. A possible explanation for this can be found in two reasons: the low base effect and the survival to be included in the 2009 sample of only those outsiders who managed to strengthen their resilience, including by efficiency improvements.
Higher labor productivity growth in less competitive firms set forth an important positive trend: narrowing gaps within individual sectors as underperformers manage some catching up with the leaders. The variance in labor productivity between the top and the bottom quintiles within one economic activity decreased across all sectors over the three years, except for chemicals and metals, which may be related in most probability to the favorable global environment and exporters' breaking away ahead from domestically-oriented producers.
Technology upgrading and innovations
Growing demand, access to easy and cheap credit, and sufficient profitability before the crisis basically made it possible for most enterprises to embrace the investment-based model of economic growth, involving renovation of their fixed assets and technologies. Some enterprises made good use of this window of opportunity. Almost 40 percent of enterprises were very active in capital investments in the years just before the crisis. However, many of them had to face their investment cycles disrupted by the crisis. As a result, Russian enterprises continue to lag behind their rivals in technological standards. Self-assessments of the technological level of production indicate (Fig. 4 ) that on average only a fourth of the surveyed respondents believe that their technological level is in line with that of their foreign 5 We do not include here the data of 2008, when many industries were severely impacted by the crisis.
competitors. Another 30 percent of companies think that their technologies meet the highest domestic standards.
Assuming that the "sound technology performance" watershed lies roughly at the level of the Russian best practice, the chemical industry would come out as the top performer. The timber and metals sectors have also performed better than the sample average. However, the timber industry has also shown a coexistence of firms meeting the most stringent international standards and those hopelessly behind, both in high proportion. This may be an evidence of extremely high heterogeneity of this sector. The poorest performance has been reported for the transport vehicles and machines and equipment engineering. as backward production does not create demand for innovation and suppresses supply, while absent supply in its way tends to be a drag on demand. While grouping the companies, we have taken into account not only their use of innovation, but also their R&D spending and the specificity of the markets which new products target. Analysis shows that the manufacturing sector is dominated by abstainers (no innovation) and imitators, who opt for adopting off-the-shelf solutions. A mere fifth of the companies while absorbing innovation have at least the whole domestic market in mind, with most of such enterprises concentrated in electronic engineering. Global innovators are most numerous in the chemicals sector and are altogether absent from the timber sector.
Technology underperformance is among the crucial reasons behind low competitiveness of Russian industrial firms. Enterprises perceiving themselves in line with the national best practice in technology performance and above have productivity 45 percent higher than all the other enterprises in the sample. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, proactive investment behavior has been raising productivity by 26 percent, while proactive innovation behavior (eyeing at least the national market backed by in-house R&D spending) has been adding another 15 percent to productivity gains.
And still, the trends observable prior to the crisis provide good reasons for cautious optimism. Unlike in earlier years, when proactive innovation was not always rewarded by improvements in competitiveness, the situation was more healthy and market-driven by 2009.
Innovative enterprises now are really more competitive. Moreover, competitiveness improves as innovation goes deeper (Fig.6 ). 
Ownership and Corporate governance: from Russian specifics to international practice
Throughout almost the whole transition period, two key features of Russian corporate governance have been unanimously noted by researchers. Russia features a very high equity concentration ratio, giving rise to tight control of the dominant owner over the corporate processes and management bodies, sometimes to the detriment of minority shareholders. Our data suggest that the Russian system of corporate governance has been evolving toward convergence with systems of most advanced economies. These developments provide for a gradual future improvement of corporate governance in Russia. This development is observed more as a tendency rather than as a universal phenomenon. A panel data analysis shows that each fifth firm has decreased its ownership concentration, while each sixth company has increased it. Lower concentration has been a result of deliberate measures by dominant owners, as incumbent business owners were more frequently reducing the ownership concentration ratio. Increased public offerings and trading in company stock and bonds further contributed to the same effect. It should be emphasized that stock exchange funding increased during this period, as the share of JSC publicly trading in their securities (shares and bonds) doubled over 4 years -from 4.8 percent to 9.6 percent.
Another important development over the recent years was the trend to transfer control from owners to hired managers. According to the data 41 percent of business companies in Economists and policy-makers have long been heatedly debating the impact of ownership structure on business operations and of the role of foreign ownership in particular.
In Russia, it has always been especially difficult to pinpoint and dissect the ownership factor from many others, not in the least because of low transparency of ownership structures. This is why empirical studies (not very numerous) would generate differing, sometimes conflicting results.
Our study suggests that firm behavior and business competitiveness have developed more close links to the structure of equity capital. Specifically, there has emerged an explicit positive correlation with foreign co-ownership, earlier observed both in advanced and transition economies.
Foreign participation boosts vigorous modernization behavior of enterprises (Fig. 7) , promoting comprehensive development of business and alignment of strategic and day-to-day managerial objectives. Enterprises with foreign ownership are seeking market leadership (43 percent of those), as they are more inclined to strategic behavior and more active in investments. These enterprises are looking for strategic partnerships, first of all, internationally. Strategic targets are based on benchmarking with foreign competitors and significantly more frequent leveraging of other management technologies, business restructuring measures and measures to enhance accounting and reporting.
Opposite to sometimes mentioned thethis that foreign owners are not interested in innovative development of their Russian assets, our study shows that it is not quite so. Firms with foreign interest demonstrate a more proactive innovation behavior. Over 60 percent of them offered new products, while over 50 percent developed new technologies. As a result, firms with foreign participation include 50 percent more innovative firms. However, we should make a reservation on this point that it may be due to the positive selection effect, i.e.
because foreign investors initially tend to cherry-pick more efficient enterprises for their participation. It should be also noted that our survey does not support a general understanding that foreigners come to Russia exclusively to tap the domestic market: almost 89 percent of enterprises with foreign equity are exporters, notably, not only in resource-intensive sectors.
These enterprises have exports shares in their sales 4 times exceeding those for enterprises without foreign equity with higher share of export going to non-CIS countries (39 percent of their exports to non-CIS vs 21 percent of non-CIS exports for other enterprises).
Quality of management: sound management is essential for competitiveness
For many years, poor management of Russian enterprises associated with inadequate management skills has been seen as a key weakness of the Russian economy, in spite of the fact that it were management innovations that drove firm efficiency in the first half of the 2000s. Our earlier study (Golikova et al. 2007) found out that by 2004-2005 the quality of management at Russian manufacturing enterprises was highly varied. Some enterprises were leveraging a wide array of state-of-the-art management technologies and engaging MBA graduates, while others did not use even the most elementary modern production management
methods.
An empirical survey may assess the quality of management by the number of management technologies employed . Generally, the higher the number, the better would be the management. Distribution of enterprises into three groups 7 shows that about a third falls into a group with underdeveloped management, about a half performs at a mid-range level, while a fifth has management above the average. It is noteworthy that a long tail of poor performers in management is quite characteristic for other BRIC countries (e.g. for Brazil and India) and is not specifically limited to Russia (Bloom & Reenen, 2010) .
Despite the limitations of the indicator used to measure the quality of management, many determinants identified at Russian enterprises are surprisingly similar to those discovered by cross-country surveys. Thus, the quality of management appears significantly better in larger enterprises, in foreign-owned companies and in exporters. (Fig. 9 ). In the Russian context, a better performance is also seen in companies, which make part of The quality of management is an important contributor to firm competitiveness. Other variables constant, firms with management performance "above average" tend to become leaders 5+ times more frequently than firms with management performance "below average".
Competitiveness leadership is most related to such management technologies as branding and ISO certification. A significant association between competitiveness and 7 The highest possible number of management technologies assessed in the survey is 14, the sample average is 4.12, and the median is 4. We have classified the surveyed enterprises into three groups by their management performance: "considerably lower than average" (0-2 technologies utilized); «average» (3-5 management instruments); and «above average» (6 and more).
branding is a new development, not observed by the survey of 2005. The value of trademarks and brands was growing in recent years, as evidenced by the fact that branding was adopted by a quarter of the enterprises in the panel, which had not been involved in this activity before 2005.
A separate mention is deserved by the progress achieved in ISO certification. By now half of the industrial enterprises have been certified -11.2 percentage points more than in 2005 (growth by 8.1 percent for the panel).. This is especially the case for larger enterprises, with two thirds of certified enterprises in the group employing 500-1000 people, and above 80 percent of companies in the group of companies employing above 1000.
A recent observable development is the use of management innovations not instead but along with major investments and technological innovation. This suggests that innovation in a broad sense as it is seen internationally may be applicable to some enterprises, i.e. innovation in business models, products and processes. The share of enterprises leveraging various management technologies is 1.5-2.5 times larger in the group of innovative and investment proactive enterprises (see Fig. 10 ). As a result, each third enterprise in this group demonstrates management better than average, while in the group of non-innovative and noninvesting (or investing on a small scale) enterprises it would be only every tenth. horizon under a year, in 2009 claimed they could plan for 1-3 years ahead, while 15 percent of them said they could plan for more than three years. Generally, a longer planning horizon is typical for enterprises in holding groups, for enterprises employing over 500 people and also for companies geared toward innovation or imitation. The longer is the planning horizon, the more often enterprises tend to practice systemic improvements of management and major investments. 
The Labor Market: is manufacturing facing skills shortages
Throughout the 1990s, redundant labor persisted as the key labor-related problem faced by enterprises. It means enterprises had excess employees increasing their costs. In the 2000s, especially in the second half of the decade, enterprises were increasingly complaining about labor deficit, though complaints about surplus labor also persisted. Earlier studies (Gimpelson et al, 2008) revealed that less efficient enterprises are more likely to report labor deficit as regards skilled labor. We argued that labor deficit complaints were rather caused by low efficiency and inability to pay competitive wages than by the actual lack of skilled workforce in the labor market. share exceeded 70 percent. At the same time, the share of understaffed enterprises halved (from 27 percent to 13 percent), whereas the proportion of excessively staffed firms remained unchanged (edged down to 12 percent from the earlier 13 percent). In other words, the economic crisis, has dramatically reduced demand for labor and accelerated decline in employment and has demonstrated that the Russian manufacturing sector is rather dominated by the problem of excess employment. The fact of this switchover from deficit to surplus is further supported by other surveys of large and medium-sized enterprises (IET, 2010).
In a crisis environment, it will be first of all successful companies that can maintain optimal staffing. For enterprises that assess their financial and economic position as sound, the magnitude of suboptimal employment (as a quantifying measure of variation from the norm), even if they report it, would be much lower. It does not exceed 10 percent of payroll headcount, while in the group of weak financial and economic performers the shortage would be 15 percent on average (if they have a shortage, of course), while the surplus would be above 22 percent.
However, structural deficit, specifically, skilled labor deficit, arguably does have some reality behind it in manufacturing. It is evidenced, in particular, by the fact that even during the crisis skilled labor shortages are reported by over 36 percent of enterprises. Yet, compared to the 2005 survey, when this problem was reported by over half of the respondents, the improvement appears visible.
Summing up, labor shortage complaints have become much less frequent (though their occurrence is non-zero) than in 2005, while labor excess complaints occur relatively more frequently (though they have not become across-the-board despite the crisis). Many enterprises report both at the same time, though for varying occupational groups. During the downturn, as well as during the boom, the key contributor to labor shortages continues to be relatively inadequate compensation, rather than the physical deficit of workforce in the labor market. As for the structural deficit of certain staff categories, we believe it is rooted in the underdeveloped system of vocational and professional training, especially in-house training, rather than in their physical shortage.
Formally, staff training has been reported by every second industrial enterprise in our survey 8 , which may be considered reasonably high performance (though in 2005 this proportion was 69 percent). However, the key issue here is that the overwhelming number of enterprises pursue their training programs on a very small scale. This refers both to their coverage and duration. Indeed, only every fifth enterprise has training programs covering over 10 percent of employees, while only 15 percent has programs lasting for over a month.
Still another specific feature of the Russian labor market that may be driving deficits, including structural deficits, is its flexibility. Russian labor market flexibility primarily comes from the low share of the basic rate (fixed part of labor compensation) in total labor costs. On the one hand, this feature allows enterprises to promptly respond and adapt to any changes in the market and manage costs. On the other hand, it encourages high labor turnover, because employees tend to be predominately motivated by the current wage level. In its turn, high turnover creates disincentives for enterprises to invest in training and retraining. (Fig. 12) . However, it would be fair to say that most enterprises did not incur burdensome costs while assisting the authorities.
This "socially responsible" behavior was often rewarded. Indeed, in the group of socially responsible companies 27-34 percent of respondents reported receiving some kind of regional government support, versus only 12 percent in the group of businesses that did not spend on social development of their regions. Due to the nature of our study we could survey only "insiders", i.e. the companies that have already entered the regional market and developed relations with the authorities.
Therefore they can feel relatively comfortable compared to outsiders, who have not yet entered the market. This "insider alliance" theory may be further supported by the evidence revealed in the course of the study that enterprises established before 1991 get priority in access to support at any level of government. However, preferences granted to firms with foreign equity run counter to this assumption, suggesting at least co-existence of a variety of criteria that may determine granting regional and municipal government support.
Conclusion: will the crisis become a moment of truth for the Russian industry?
Before the crisis, as we tried to show with reference to some cases, Russia's manufacturing was undergoing strong structural transformation, followed by enterprise behavior changes. These processes had a direct impact on firm efficiency and competitiveness. Certainly, a detailed study of the changes and their underlying causes requires further profound analysis. However, the general development trends seem quite obvious.
The development was based on optimized utilization of available resources within the bounds of existing company markets and largely inside the entrenched basic technologies.
This conclusion is supported both by the stable structure of product markets and by low innovation and investment performance, accompanied by a persisting technology gap vis-à-vis international rivals. It may be said with some stretching that Russian enterprises generally continued manufacturing the same products using the same production capacities and technologies, while selling them to the same buyers..
While the public and experts were debating pros and contras of the catch up type of development, and the government urged for an innovative break-through, most enterprises seemed to bet on the catch-up strategy, based on absorption and implementation of the existing (mostly foreign) technologies and equipment, and small-scale and imitating innovations. While the economy was growing, this strategy proved successful for many enterprises, albeit only for those who started pursuing it several years before the crisis.
Still, the pre-crisis period was the period of "positive selection": more efficient competitive enterprises were growing faster than those less competitive. The latter (those who Such intentions indicate that the crisis could lead to market redistribution in favor of more efficient enterprises and create incentives for broadening one's market and leveraging investment to enhance production effic iency. Admittedly, however, it would be more difficult in the post-crisis world even for Russia's manufacturing leaders to move from the defensive strategy (defending one's entrenched positions in existing markets) to an offensive breakthrough into new markets or new product markets. We can hardly expect in the near future to get the same favorable conditions, i.e. cheap credit and galloping demand, as we saw in the years leading up to the crisis.
This may be the reason, as we see it, why many manufacturing enterprises have again found themselves at the cross-roads, facing a dilemma: should they revert to the earlier strategy of gradual evolutionary improvements aimed at catching up with competitors shooting ahead, or should they try and leverage the crisis to challenge their rivals and pressure them out both in the domestic market and in global markets? The way this dilemma is resolved will largely depend on government policies. This is not an easy trade-off. Given the difficult situation many enterprises find themselves in, a wish to help and to protect is only too natural. Moreover, it is supported by the expectations of the business community. Thus, every second respondent in our survey spoke for a freeze on natural monopoly tariffs, while larger government procurement and import restrictions got 20 percent of votes each. Only tax reductions, banking system support and support to the ruble exchange rate are more popular with enterprise top managers than the above measures.
So far policy-makers have been staking on the "national champions". However, our data suggest that "runners up" are more resilient and have a higher capacity for relatively lowcost growth. In our survey (which is generally biased toward medium-sized enterprises) these would be companies employing 500 and above people. Providing support to such firms poses fewer risks of government failure. As such firms are numerous, risks of supporting inefficient firms are neutralized. And still, appropriate channels and appropriately designed support instruments are essential.
In defiance of the entrenched stereotypes, the manufacturing sector has accumulated potential capable of driving economic growth. Today, it depends on the government and its willingness to interact with business how much of this potential will be tapped to drive development in Russia.
